Negotiation Déjà Vu: The INF Treaty and US Withdrawal

The Cold War between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. prompted negotiations to lower the risk of nuclear war. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty reinforced the idea of nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction: without missile defense, destruction was more likely. Everyone also agreed, having fewer missiles around was a good idea.  

In 1987, the nations signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty addressing tactical missiles. The U.S. and Russia then signed and fully ratified a strategic arms treaty in 1991, a second in 1993. Yet in 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty, and Russia suspended their obligations.  

Negotiations are not static activities. Engagement includes developing support and assessing change. And while assessing change comes second, it initiates a virtuous loop back to partnership preparation and engagement.  

Assessing change includes four steps about the ‘why’ of the negotiation: guiding appropriate timing, partaking in insightful discernment, contributing to reinforcing reciprocity, and leading thorough reviews.  

Fantasy Reviews

INF included sections that would be models for future treaties: mutual inspection, verification, and treaty reviews. But tensions between Russia and the U.S. throughout the following years tempered engagement. The U.S. unilaterally withdrew from ABM in 2002, in a desire to prevent attacks by terrorists and adversarial nations, without meeting with the INF body established to resolve differences. They next met unproductively in 2016 and 2017.  

People change naturally during implementation, and the negotiation’s context may vary, even as goals remain largely the same. Reviews of change need to be timely. A review delayed is a failure in preparing and engaging.  

Time and circumstances change frameworks that once worked. This may alter available choices, problem-solving methods, and documentation types needed to support relationships and a common solution.  

Imaginary Reciprocity

The proliferation of missile technology among countries unbound by INF started in the 1990s. As the U.S. pushed forward with tactical ABM technology to protect themselves and their allies, Russia, bordered by potentially adversarial countries with missiles and nuclear capabilities, pursued their own technologies. By 2007, the U.S. and NATO started planning ABM sites in the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians objected to U.S. withdrawal from ABM and threatened to withdraw from INF.  

Reciprocity can provide equal-for-equal measures or can use those differently. Offers can be conditional grants or unconditional. Measures can address the terms of negotiating itself or the terms of a mutual solution.  

Reciprocity is evident to the recipient, as is the lack thereof. Reciprocity is part of change because it alters the context and personality of negotiation. Its basis requires divining the underlying interests of the other party.  

Renewed Discernment

The U.S. concluded in 2013 that Russia was developing a tactical missile that violated the INF. The U.S. formalized that assessment in 2014, at which point Russia formalized their claims that the U.S. was also in violation by using ABM target technology, weaponized drones, and the planned deployment of the U.S. ABM systems near Russian borders. As the years passed and the context changed, neither party consistently discerned (or believed) the other’s underlying interests.  

Discerning a party’s true interests or concerns is a skill critical for creating and maintaining partnerships. Engagement requires continuous examination of interests and concerns.  

During preparation, negotiators explore the context and consider the best personality for the discussion. Engagement tests this planning and includes review to revisit plans and renew engagement. The main element of review is timing.

Timing Redux

There are likely many reasons why neither the U.S. nor Russia directly dealt with INF's changing context. INF used a highly technical definition of one class of missiles, conventional or nuclear, and in any location. Addressing this was an 'easier' task than achieving agreement on broader issues and left strategic topics unaddressed.  

Keeping INF up-to-date required routine discussion given the long timespan and many people involved. INF was meant to last forever, and discerning anew required proactive efforts. The foundations of the original INF negotiation changed over time, and the initial partnership was left to decay.  

Timing moderates the pace of effective change. We discern interests under positions as well as concerns under emotions, pursue reciprocity, and review purposefully. In partnership, we seek a common perception.