Seven countries, including Iran, agreed in 2015 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), constraining Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. After signing, the U.S. Congress did not enact a resolution of disapproval for the JCPOA by their own self-imposed deadline. Without this disapproval, the JCPOA came into force under United Nations Security Council resolution 2231. Yet, in 2018, a new U.S. administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA.
Negotiations in the public eye would seem to involve copious planning. Preparation includes understanding the context and establishing the negotiation’s personality. And while personality comes second, style does matter.
Personality includes four steps about the ‘how’ of the negotiation: evaluating different frameworks, judging the range of available choices, deciding the pathway to solutions, and establishing the method of documentation.
Documentation Mirages
The context for the negotiation of JCPOA was evident to all parties. Iran had been developing nuclear technology since 2003, joining a long list of counties with clandestine nuclear programs. As with ballistic missiles, no country has ever taken nuclear weapons away from another once possessed. Countries consider nuclear weapons a deterrent for a clearly understood reason: they work. The international JCPOA addressed the concern for Iran's rapid production of nukes.
Written agreements provide a mechanism to convey solutions to others over time and distance. Yet agreements are intermediate—only a vehicle for implementation. An agreement is not an ultimate objective; the goals are.
Documentation presumes the parties' share an understanding of the problem being solved and the solution being defined. Only agreement implementation delivers results. Documents never solve problems on their own.
Problem Solving Ignored
The context for the JCPOA included a wide variety of interested parties, as well as a lack of common perspective about the real problem. The approaches of domestic U.S. and Iranian actors overlapped and conflicted with each other and with those of regional countries. Some focused on the definitive danger of nuclear weapons while others on the ambiguous simplicity of preventing ‘bad’ behavior. The problem of managing nuclear capability was ill-defined.
Negotiators consider the personality of a negotiation during preparation because such decisions interact with the context. The more parties involved, the more a negotiator must advocate and reinforce a productive style for bargaining.
An approach toward problem-solving is required within diverse groups as much as between disparate groups. Without consensus on an actual problem, much less a desired outcome, negotiations are decidedly bipolar.
Reawakened Choices
Too many choices were offered to address the vexing concerns about Iran, nuclear weapons, and regional behavior. Decision-making for a common solution fragmented among differing parties in the U.S., the international community, and Iran. JCPOA recognized the complexity of decisions needed for managing nuclear weapons but set aside those for gaining support for a document that was notably not a U.S. treaty. By withdrawing from JCPOA, the U.S. simply decreased its leverage for change. Styles for complexity and simplicity collided for failure.
Skilled negotiators evaluate different pathways for their realism, achievability, and consequences (intended and otherwise). Successful pursuit of collaboration recognizes complexity, allowing common solutions to develop in dialogue.
When a party avoids the complexity inherent in context, actions are more likely to generate unintended consequences. Complex environments provide choices. Negotiators focused on complexity find solutions.
Framing Redux
One frame of reference for JCPOA focused on managing Iran’s capabilities, delaying nuclear weapons development, and avoiding war (nuclear or otherwise). With the sole possible exception of Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, no country had ever prevented another from creating nuclear weapons. The frame was clear but unshared.
Another frame focused on the breadth of Iran’s international activities and anticipated the threat of attack as sufficient to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Subsequent punitive sanctions hurt Iran’s economy but risked strengthening their resolve. Competing frames orient expectations, guide perceptions, and constrain leverage.
Proper framing provides the structure needed for successful negotiations. We provide enough but not too many choices, approach problem solving patiently, and use documentation appropriately. In partnership, we pursue a common association.